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Abstract
Scholars have explored the rise of far‐right reactionary political parties in Europe over the last decade. However, social
movements reflecting similar political orientations have rarely been conceptualized as “reactionary.” To better understand
the political orientations of reactionary transnational social movements such as the Identitarians and the Defence Leagues,
we explore how and why ethnonational symbols derived from the medieval period are utilized by adherents. This interdis‐
ciplinary investigation argues that, through processes of mediated political medievalism, ethnonational symbols are used
as strategic framing devices to reimagine an idealized “golden age” of distinct European nations, to assign blame for the
erosion of ethnonational identity through multiculturalism, immigration and “Islamization,” to establish an intergenera‐
tional struggle against the supposed incursion of Islam in Europe, and to proscribe and justify the use of violence as a
means of re‐establishing the primacy of European nations.
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1. Introduction
The rise of reactionary politics in European countries
in recent decades has led scholars to consider the ori‐
gins, orientations, and success of nationalistic, far‐right,
populist political parties (Grindheim, 2019; Rooduijn,
2015; Wodak, 2015). In parallel, scholars have also
charted the mobilization of non‐party political far‐right
social movements such as the English Defence League
in Great Britain and Génération Identitaire in France
(Busher, 2016; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2010; Guenther et al.,
2020; Zúquete, 2018). A range of grievances common to
both far‐right parties and social movements include the
loss of national attachments and ethnocultures through
processes of multiculturalism, the threat to majority
populations by immigration, and a perceived threat to
“Indigenous” nations by Islam (Bernsand, 2013; Capelos
& Katsanidou, 2018; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015).
In addition to these common grievances, many reac‐
tionary social movements in Europe evince the use of
images and narratives drawn from the medieval period
(Koch, 2017). At the heart of this inquiry is the ques‐
tion: What does the appropriation of themes from
the medieval past tell us about the grievances, objec‐
tives, and strategies of reactionary social movements?
By conceptualizing far‐right, transnational social move‐
ments as “reactionary” movements, we consider their
use of “radical nostalgia” to construct ethnonational
symbols as strategic framing devices. Focused on the
appropriation of symbols derived from the medieval
period with an emphasis on the crusades, we explore
the Identitarians and the Defence Leagues in Europe.
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The former announced its existence in France in 2012
as Génération Identitaire through a protest located at a
site associated with the 732 CE Battle of Tours (Simpson
& Druxes, 2015, p. 177). Similarly, the inaugural appear‐
ance of the English Defence League in England in 2009
on St. George’s Day was organized in part by an activist
dubbing himself Paul “The Lionheart” Ray (Busher, 2016,
p. 4). From the outset, both transnational social move‐
ments have strategically framed reactionary political
orientations through utilizing ethnonational symbols.
Originating in a radically nostalgic interpretation of the
medieval period, particularly those associated with the
crusades, the Identitarians and Defence Leagues reimag‐
ine a lost “golden age” of both ethnonational distinctive‐
ness as well as Europeanmobilization against an external
“other.” Some examples of these themes are depicted
below, such as a crusader knight in prayer (Figure 2) and
amythologized crusading knight chasing away an observ‐
ably Muslim mother (Figure 3).
This interdisciplinary inquiry unfolds in three phases.
The first section reviews the conceptual and empiri‐
cal literature on the Identitarians and Defence Leagues.
While accepting the conceptual framework of earlier
scholarship, we argue firstly that these social move‐
ments should also be considered “reactionary,” espe‐
cially through their radically nostalgic reimagining of the
medieval period. Secondly, despite their ethnic nativism,
the Identitarians and Defence Leagues should also be
considered “transnational” social movements. This sec‐
tion then presents the analytical framework, arguing that
an ethnosymbolic approach best suits consideration of
how these movements operationalize “medievalism” to
construct ethnonational symbols derived from a radically
nostalgic reimagining of the medieval period. It then
adopts a strategic framing lens to explore the utility of
ethnonational symbols, with a focus on problem defini‐
tion, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment
recommendations.
The second section presents a range of images and
narratives drawn frompublic content of the Identitarians
and the Defence Leagues, in which they utilize appro‐
priated symbols from the medieval period online and
at demonstrations. The historical context from which
these symbols are derived is provided with a focus on
medieval encounters in which a predominately Christian
Europe is engaged in single or prolonged confrontation
with Islamic powers.
The final section discusses the utility of ethnona‐
tional symbols derived from themedieval period for reac‐
tionary socialmovements: Firstly, ethnonational symbols
frame core, interrelated problems for adherents, includ‐
ing the perceived loss of “native” European nations and
cultures, attributed casually to the European Union’s
support for multicultural civic nationalism; concomitant
increases in non‐European immigration and in particu‐
lar the immigration of Muslims. Secondly, ethnonational
symbols create a moral framework of “us vs. them,” civi‐
lizational struggle against anti‐nativist and non‐European
forces, illustrating the existential consequences of this
struggle and establishing a sense of urgency. Finally, eth‐
nonational symbols have prescriptive utility by surrepti‐
tiously conveying the need to expel immigrants, includ‐
ing through the use of violence.
2. Reimagining the Medieval: Reactionary
Transnational Social Movements and Medievalism
This section conceptualizes and explores the
Identitarians and the Defence Leagues, arguing that
they are reactionary, transnational social movements.
Secondly, we present a theoretical framework grounded
in ethnosymbolism as a means of explaining the utility
of ethnonational symbols for reactionary social move‐
ments, medievalism as the process by which symbols
are constructed, and how they are ultimately employed
as strategic framing devices.
2.1. Defining the Identitarians and Defence Leagues
Scholars have extensively explored a range of domestic
and transnational far‐right social movements in Europe,
such as CasaPound, in Italy, Pegida, which was founded
in Germany, and Soldiers of Odin, which emerged in
Scandinavia (Caiani, 2019; Castelli Gattinara & Froio,
2014). In addition to transnational cooperation, many
of these movements exhibit reactionary and radically
nostalgic orientations. However, this inquiry focuses its
attention on the Identarian and Defence League far‐right
social movements as a consequence of their ubiqui‐
tous and foundational use of ethnonational symbolism
derived from the medieval period.
The Identitarian movement began in France in the
1960s as a reaction against the intellectual liberal‐left,
describing its orientation as the “new right.” It has pre‐
dominated on continental Europe and continues to be
driven principally by a reaction to liberal internation‐
alism, global homogenization, and a vehement opposi‐
tion to immigration (Zúquete, 2018, p. 7). Strongest in
Italy and France, groups such as CasaPound in Italy and
Génération Identitaire in France oppose the liberal‐left
establishment and neo‐conservatives, declaring them‐
selves the “true right” mobilized against borderless capi‐
talism. The Identitarians defend the “right to difference”
and believe that sentiments of belonging to humanity
are mediated through culture; as a consequence, they
are determined to revitalize ethnonational, primordial
traditions. The modern incarnation of the Identitarian
movement was founded as Génération Identitaire in
France in 2012, surfacing as a youth division of the Bloc
Identitaire (Richards, 2019).
Since the early 2010s, the Identitarians began to coor‐
dinate transnationally to establish more permanent net‐
works and to share tactics. In Fulda, in 2014, a gather‐
ing of adherents committed to creating local teams and
to coordinate specific regions (Simpson & Druxes, 2015,
p. 184). Across Europe, tens of thousands are believed
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to belong to Identitarian chapters in countries such as
Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Italy. Local Identitarian
movements are oriented toward the ethnonational iden‐
tity of their territory, such as CasaPound in Italy and
the Flemish Schild & Vrienden (Maly, 2018). Identitarians
across Europe meet once annually to learn combat tech‐
niques and plan common campaigns. They share sim‐
ilar signs and symbols, including using the handshake
of Roman legionnaires (Durie, 2019). In recent years,
the Identitarians have coordinated transnational cam‐
paigns, including the 2017 Defend Europe boats mis‐
sion in the Mediterranean and the 2016 Summer of
Resistance demonstrations in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin
(Nissen, 2020).
The English Defence League was formed in Luton
in 2009 and has mobilized members principally around
contempt for Islam. It emerged from anti‐Jihad move‐
ments and from football hooliganism, and its first demon‐
stration was held in response to protests orchestrated
against the return of British troops from the Middle
East (Busher, 2016, p. 5; Jackson & Feldman, 2011, p. 8).
Despite having a stronger inclination toward violence as a
mobilizing force than the Identitarians, Defence Leagues
adherents similarly assert their disavowal of biological
racism in favor of an emphasis on protecting culture,
an antipathy to “liberal elites,” and a deeply held para‐
noia of an imperialist Islam which they believe is threat‐
ening to replace the majority population of European
states (Meleagrou‐Hitchens & Brun, 2013; Morrow &
Meadowcroft, 2019). Like the Identitarians, the Defence
Leagues also subscribe to the view that these forces will
result in an existential civilizational conflict.
The transnational Defence League network (or
European Defence League) emerged in the late 2000s/
early 2010s as anoutgrowthof the creation of the English
Defence League (Elliott, 2017, p. 157). Following a false‐
start in Amsterdam in 2010, the Defence League was
reconstituted at a counter‐Jihad rally of Defence Leagues
in Denmark, with representatives drawn from Defence
Leagues in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, UK,
Germany, Russia, and elsewhere (Hope Not Hate, n.d.).
In addition to common objectives, Defence Leagues have
established networks that share information and strate‐
gies. Like the Identitarians, they also share similar strate‐
gic frames including the adoption of ethnonational sym‐
bols appropriated from the medieval period.
The Identitarians and Defence Leagues have mobi‐
lized thousands across Europe in opposition to immi‐
gration and Islam and have been variously defined
as far‐right extremists, fascists, and radicals (Castelli
Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015;
Mattheis & Winter, 2019; Meleagrou‐Hitchens & Brun,
2013; Richards, 2019). The constituent national enti‐
ties of the Identitarian movement and the Defence
League have been described as “nativist,” which Castelli
Gattinara and Pirro (2019) term “a radical and exclu‐
sionary form of nationalism” (p. 1). Nativism describes
the exclusionary “us vs. them” boundary created by
these movements, emphasizing local attachments and
a paramount identification with nations composed of
narratives of linguistic and cultural inheritance (Olsson,
2009, p. 113). The Identitarians and Defence Leagues
espouse a kind of “cultural nationalism” where they
advance that experience is mediated principally through
culture, that culture emerges from the traditions of
nations, and that the loss of culture erodes their ethnona‐
tionalist view of identity (Meleagrou‐Hitchens & Brun,
2013, p. 25; Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Despite efforts
to avoid being described as racist, this orientation is a
form of “ethnic” nationalism rather than “civic” national‐
ism, whereby adherents emphasize the unique origins,
history, and cultures of nations, and employ symbolic
mythmaking to develop exclusive, ethnonationalist iden‐
tities (Kaufmann, 2019). For these groups, nativist ethnic
nationalism creates in‐group and out‐group dichotomies
bounded by identity, especially ethnic, cultural, and
ancestral markers (Conversi, 2009, p. 82; Ford, 2010,
p. 148; Mudde, 2007).
These nativist ethnonationalist orientations have
given rise to a number of political objectives. Firstly, their
nativist orientations oppose civic nationalism and the
EU’s effort to create a multicultural pan‐European iden‐
tity referred to as “supranationalism” (Karolewski, 2009,
p. 66; Kuzio, 2009, p. 14; Zúquete, 2015). Reactionary
far‐right social movements consider this liberal project
a “back door” to mass immigration and the conse‐
quent destruction of European nations (Meleagrou‐
Hitchens & Brun, 2013, p. 42). Secondly, despite
purporting to espouse a non‐hierarchical nationalism,
they are aggressively anti‐immigration. The Identitarians
and Defence Leagues adhere to a paranoia that the
“Indigenous” population of Europe is being super‐
seded in a “great replacement” whereby non‐majority
Europeans, particularly Muslims, will become the demo‐
graphic majority through both migration and higher
birthrates (Meleagrou‐Hitchens & Brun, 2013, p. 49;
Nissen, 2020; Pilkington, 2016, p. 135; Richards, 2019).
In response, they advocate “remigration”: the expul‐
sion of all those not of European ethnicity from Europe
(Ebner, 2019). Finally, bound up in their hostility to
immigration is Islamophobia and their opposition to the
“Islamification” of Europe (see Kaya, 2021, for more on
Islamophobia and right‐wing nativism). Paranoia against
Islam is infused with baseless accusations, such as a
predilection for pedophilia and a conspiratorial belief
that a monolithic imperialist Islam is seeking to conquer
the West (Jackson & Feldman, 2011, p. 9; Koch, 2017;
Nissen, 2020; Pilkington, 2016, p. 135).
These political orientations are manifested in direct
action campaigns such as those against the building of
Mosques, the immigration of refugees, and the provi‐
sion of Halal meats (Caiani, 2019; Meleagrou‐Hitchens
& Brun, 2013, pp. 38, 59). However, far‐right social
movementmobilization of the Identitarians and Defence
Leagues are also concerned with more paradigmatic
change forwhich ethnonational symbolism is particularly
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consequential. Firstly, the above grievances are elevated
by adherents to a continent‐wide, generational, civiliza‐
tional struggle whereby “Europeans” are in an existen‐
tial conflict with external, primarily Islamic forces (Caiani
&Weisskircher, 2019;Meleagrou‐Hitchens & Brun, 2013,
p. 2; Nissen, 2020). As argued below, this “clash of civi‐
lizations” frame is encapsulated by the Identitarians and
Defence Leagues through the use of ethnonational sym‐
bols drawn from the medieval period, particularly those
from the crusades, when European powers fought exten‐
sively with Islamic forces. Secondly, an overarching belief
amongst far‐right social movement adherents is that dis‐
tinct European nations existed in amythologized “golden
age,” where they were territorially bounded and “pure”
without dilution through significant interrelations with
other nations (Nissen, 2020). Identitarian and Defence
League adherents resent the emergence of multicultural
societies which they argue have eroded national cultures
and is abetted through parallel forces of immigration and
Islamization. As a part of this “grand narrative,” adher‐
ents furthermore idealize a return to a mythologized
period when nations were not only distinct, but also
united in their collective opposition to the supposed loss
of their civilization. Mobilization around these themes
can be conceptualized as a form of “radical nostalgia.”
Radical nostalgia has been recently discussed by
Kenny (2017) in the context of far‐right populism
in Europe, where adherents recollect past times or
“enchanted places” and utilize a “selective deployment
of the national past” (pp. 256–261). They cite Freeden
to argue that radical nostalgists seek “to establish a kind
of temporal sovereignty which is depicted as the source
of an exclusive national‐cultural tradition” (Freeden as
cited in Kenny, 2017, p. 257). As argued below, the
Identitarians and Defence Leagues are motivated by a
desire to halt multiculturalism, immigration, and the
presence of Islam in Europe with a view to returning
to a radically nostalgic imagining of a mythologized past
where European nations were distinct and “pure,” but
were nevertheless united in collective opposition to the
incursion of external, primarily non‐European, forces.
Radical nostalgia aligns with the aforementioned percep‐
tion that identity can only be maintained through cul‐
tural manifestations of a shared ethnic past and that it is
this shared history that not only defines the nation, but
excludes others from membership.
The above political orientations of the Identitarians
and Defence Leagues has often led them to be defined as
“far‐right” (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Kassimeris &
Jackson, 2015; Richards, 2019). Given the radically nostal‐
gic orientation of the Identitarians and Defence League
described above, an equally apt conceptualization of
these movements is to describe them as “reactionary.”
Reactionism is defined by Capelos and Katsanidou (2018)
as a political orientation that combines “resentful affec‐
tivity with the forceful desire to return to the past”
(p. 1272), manifested as opposition to the European
Union, cosmopolitanism, and immigration. Reactionism
is characterized by sentiments of anger, fear, betrayal,
and perceived injustice, along with the aforementioned
“radical nostalgia” as noted above (Capelos&Katsanidou,
2018; Kenny, 2017). The construction of ethnonational
symbols derived from the medieval past captures this
desire amongst reactionary far‐right social movement
adherents to give primacy to shared histories, and to
mobilize against threats to its re‐establishment.
The radically nostalgic and reactionary orienta‐
tions of the Identitarians and Defence Leagues also
has explanatory value for their transnational mobiliza‐
tion. Scholars have recently discussed the Identitarians,
Defence League, and other non‐party political far‐right
movements as transnational social movements. The lit‐
erature on social movements has historically been more
often concerned with left‐wing movements, but schol‐
ars have recently applied this lens to movements on the
right, particularly in their mobilization toward paradig‐
matic change, a disinclination toward primarily elec‐
toral politics, and their usage of strategic frames (Blee
& Creasap, 2010; Caiani & della Porta, 2018; Caiani &
Weisskircher, 2019). Furthermore, scholars have alighted
on the increasingly transnational orientation of reac‐
tionary far‐right social movements (Schlembach, 2011;
Zúquete, 2015). This is especially the case in Europe
where they are organizing across borders through
shared tactics, resources, and strategic frames (Caiani,
2019). Despite having a primarily “national” focus,
most far‐right organizations are active beyond borders
(Caiani, 2018, p. 570). In addition to anti‐immigration
and anti‐Islam movements such as Pegida, Soldiers of
Odin, and the formation of the European Counter‐Jihad
Movement, the Identitarians and European Defence
League have been active transnationally for years.
In spite of their aforementioned localized form of
nativism, these reactionary far‐right social movements
acknowledge a civilizational “European” identity, with
shared histories and cultural lineages which under‐
pins their organization as transnational movements
(Bernsand, 2013). This strategy is both functional and
ideational. In the former respect, reactionary move‐
ments like the Identitarians and Defence League share
aims and tactics, as discussed above. Ideationally, their
transnationality recreates a radically nostalgic, medieval,
“golden age” whereby distinctive, European nations coa‐
lesced in violent, civilizational confrontation with incur‐
sionary, Islamic forces (Simpson & Druxes, 2015, p. 183).
The following section argues that this complex “grand
narrative” is encapsulated by reactionary far‐right social
movements through the use of ethnonational symbols
appropriated from themedieval period and employed as
strategic frames.
2.2. Reactionary Transnational Social Movements,
Ethnonational Symbols, and Strategic Framing
The Identitarians and Defence Leagues are less con‐
cerned with impacting elected politics and more with
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mobilizing adherents around reimagining the world as it
oncewas and how it nowought to be (Busher, 2016, p. 8).
Symbolism is integral to their ideal world fabrication as
symbols represent “group life,” confer membership on
adherents as “badges of identity” that demarcate bound‐
aries; they maintain unity and infuse commitment to a
common cause (Klatch, 1988). The creation of ethnona‐
tional symbols is best discussed through the lens of eth‐
nosymbolism as advanced by Smith (2009). We further
argue that ethnonational symbols created by these social
movements are constructed through a process referred
to as “mediated political medievalism” and that these
radically nostalgic ethnonational symbols are ultimately
then employed as strategic framing devices.
The ethnosymbolismapproach involves analyzing col‐
lective identities through symbolic resources made up
of traditions, myths, symbols, and other subjective fac‐
tors (Smith, 2009, p. 16). It firstly argues that repertoires
of symbols serve to sharpen distinctions between mem‐
bers and non‐members and thusly construct ideational,
“us vs. them” boundaries. Secondly, shared memories,
traditions, and symbols establish intergenerational con‐
tinuity and function to establish “grand narratives” nos‐
talgically anchored in an exemplary period or “golden
age.” Thirdly, symbols are the means by which these
collective identities assert a common ethnicity, as well
as a transnational common cause which unites dis‐
tinct nations. Finally, ethnosymbolism advances that the
re‐appropriation of the ethnic past is important to under‐
standing the creation of ethnonational boundaries in the
present (Smith, 2009, p. 39).
This approach suits the analysis of reactionary
transnational social movements’ creation of ethnona‐
tional symbols derived from the medieval period, as
through them they operationalize radically nostalgic,
newly constructed worlds, establish intergenerational
continuity, mobilize members through assertions of
ethnic identity, and establish in‐group and out‐group
boundaries. The Identitarians and Defence Leagues con‐
struct ethnonational symbols sourced from themedieval
period through a process referred to as “medieval‐
ism,” whereby symbols or narratives originating in the
medieval period are used in contemporary contexts
(Elliott, 2017, p. 6). This definition creates a dichotomy
between myth and reality, with this difference being cru‐
cial to our understanding of the adoption of medieval
symbolism by social movements as it represents the
myth or “gap” where groups alter or simplify the historic
time and place for their political purposes in what Elliott
refers to as “mediated political medievalism” (Elliott,
2017, p. 10; Livingstone, 2017).
Medievalism functions as the process of converting
“symbolic religiosity,” which is the consumption of reli‐
gious symbols for secular purposes, into ethnonational
symbols. This is relevant as many of the narratives and
symbols appropriated from the medieval period had
deeply religious connotations in the period, particularly
those from the crusades. Elliott (2017) argues contempo‐
rary political entrepreneurs, such as the Identitarians and
the Defence Leagues, undertake a three‐stage medieval‐
ismprocess: Firstly, they select and appropriatemedieval
objects and symbols, such as a statue of Joan of Arc
or the cross of St. George; secondly, through repeti‐
tion they “flatten” these symbols and insert new mean‐
ing laden with their ideology; finally, they couple these
symbols with their ethnonationalist ideology. Through
medievalism, formerly religious, medieval symbols are
transformed into contemporary ethnonational symbols.
Medievalism as a process of secularization is not
new. Tyerman (1998, pp. 101, 105) argues that the
Protestant Reformation produced a “secularization of
the Holy War” and saw the significant losses as a sign
of religious impurity. Historiography of the 17th and
18th centuries, such as Maimbourg’s History of the
Crusades (1675) or Schoeplin’s De Scaris Galliae Regum
in Orientum Expeditionibus (1726), added to this “sec‐
ularization” of the crusades because it focused on the
heroic actions of individuals, creating national rather
than religious usages.
The 19th century witnessed another turn in
historiographic focus toward “romantic nostalgia
and supremacist ideology” (Tyerman, 1998, p. 117).
Examples of this can be seen inWilliamHillary, an English
Knight of Malta, who called for a new crusade in 1840.
In the same decade, forgeries of individuals’ lineage to
crusaders were produced en masse, and in 1895 when
a re‐enactment of the procession at Clermont marked
its 800th anniversary (Tyerman, 1998, pp. 117–118).
We can see the idealization of individuals with Frederick
Barbarossa as a hero in German propaganda or Keiser
Wilhelm II’s 1898 visit to Jerusalem and Damascus
being portrayed as a pilgrim and holy warrior (Tyerman,
1998, p. 121).
A more recent example from the European far‐
right is the intense mythologizing undertaken by the
German Nazi party in the 1920s to 1940s. Nazi identity
entrepreneurs liberally appropriated the mythologizing
of the medieval period, as seen in the poster of Nazi
leader Adolf Hitler appearing as a knight (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Der Bannerträger (The standard bearer), ca.
1935. Source: The US Holocaust Memorial Museum
(n.d.).
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What remains to be elucidated is how ethnonational
symbols function as strategic framing devices. Social
movement scholars considering far‐right mobilization
have employed framing as a means of analyzing their
transnational strategies. Framing refers to how move‐
ment entrepreneurs summarize and simplify complex
ideas, grievances, and objectives with a view to aggre‐
gating support, compel action and demobilize opponents
(Caiani, 2019; Nissen, 2020; see Kiss, 2021, for more
on political communication and mobilization). Guenther
et al. (2020) consider the use of strategic framing to
achieve four ends: to define the problem identified by
adherents, to assign causal attribution for the problem,
to establish how this problem is morally evaluated and
finally, to assign a treatment aimed at solving the prob‐
lem. As argued in the final section, the Identitarians and
Defence Leagues employ ethnonational symbols as con‐
venient strategic framing devices to achieve the above
aims, with those drawn from the medieval period com‐
mon to both movements.
3. Radical Nostalgia and the Medieval Period: Origins
of Reactionary Social Movement Ethnonational
Symbols
The Identitarians and Defence Leagues appropriate nar‐
ratives and motifs from the medieval period to create
unifying ethnonational symbols which establish a radi‐
cally nostalgic interpretation of Europe’s past and ideal‐
ize amythologized “golden age” towhich their adherents
seek a “return.” There are many instances of the usage
of ethnonational symbols in both movements and while
they draw on a wide range of geographical and tempo‐
ral contexts, the below homes in on the usage of sym‐
bols originating from the crusader period. This period is
selected because of the ubiquity of these themes in reac‐
tionary social movement public content and the demon‐
strable “us vs. them” dichotomy between European and
Islamic powers. Some examples of these themes are a
crusader knight in prayer (Figure 2) and a mythologized
crusading knight chasing away an observably Muslim
mother (Figure 3).
Figure 2. “I am not racist, I am anti‐Islam.” Source: The
Spanish Defence League (2015).
Figure 3. Generation Identity stickers appeared in an
Essex town. Source: Sharman and Dearden (2019).
The term “crusades” is used to refer to a series of expe‐
ditions to the East beginning in 1095 aimed at regaining
the Holy Land from Muslim control. For traditional his‐
torians, the crusades ended after the 1291 fall of Acre—
the final major Christian stronghold. However, some his‐
torians include the Reconquista period in Spain in the
late medieval period. Reactionary far‐right social move‐
ments draw on this period in their ethnonational symbol‐
ism (Figure 4).
Figure 4. A sticker of the German IdentitarianMovement
reading “Europe, Youth, Reconquista,” alongside a sticker
advertising the neo‐Nazi martial arts group White Rex.
Source: FOIA Research (n.d.).
The First Crusade was launched by Pope Urban II in his
sermon at the Council of Clermont (27 November 1095)
which called for military support to liberate Christian
pilgrimage sites in the Holy Land from Muslim control
(Folda, 2008, p. 15). Those who “took up the cross”
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were encouraged by the remission of sins, plenary indul‐
gences, and the hope of ascension to heaven. This
was an odd kind of pilgrimage because it was also a
war, and therefore, mainly young healthy laymen were
encouraged to participate (Riley‐Smith, 1987, pp. 6–9).
The Identitarians use this event and Pope Urban II’s
famous words “Deus Vult” (God wills it) as exemplified
by Martin Sellner, leader of the Identitäre Bewegung
Österreichs (Austria’s Identitarian Movement), in his
tweet: “To all Christians: Chase away your lousy cardi‐
nals and bishops and do something! #remigration.” This
tweet was accompanied by an image of Pope Urban II,
captioned: “‘Defend Europe’ and ‘Deus Vult,’ or Godwills
it, the rallying cry of the First Crusade” (Zúquete, 2020).
The symbol of the cross linked the two functions of
pilgrimage and holywar (Tyerman, 1998, p. 79). AsUrban
II’s speech demonstrates, the cross was associated with
the crusades from its beginning and was inscribed with
various meanings: a badge of penance, a contractual
agreement, fiscal and legal immunities, and a talisman
(Tyerman, 1998, pp. 22, 76). The cross most often por‐
trayed on crusader imagery is that of St. George: a red
cross on a white background, which became a prolific
aesthetic used within crusader imagery from the late
medieval period onwards. The predominant organizing
symbol of the English Defence League is the cross of
St. George as seen online (Figure 5), at demonstrations
(Figure 6), and as English Defence League adherents sing
patriotic songs like “Keep St. George in My Heart.”
St. George’s role as a military saint stems from a
legend in which he aided Godfrey of Bouillon during
the siege of Antioch (21 October 1097–2 June 1098).
Dwindling supplies and harsh weather led many cru‐
saders to desert the cause by early 1098 (Riley‐Smith,
1987, p. 29). Adhemar of Le Puy, a principal leader in
the battle, felt their lack of luck was due to a lack of
piety so he ordered his knights to fast for three days,
lead a procession, and affix a cross to their garments
(Frankopan, 2016, p. 157). After this, according to legend,
an army on horseback led by St. George, St. Demetrius,
and St. Mercurius miraculously assisted in defeating the
Turks (Riley‐Smith, 1987, pp. 30–31). St. George’s inter‐
vention occurred again at the 1177 Battle of Montgisard
(Rogers, 2010, p. 211). These examples demonstrate the
connection between piety and war where the favour of
God was necessary to achieve victory.
Following a harrowing journey from Europe to the
Levant, many viewed the success of the crusade as a
miraculous gift fromGod, stimulating legends and heroic
tales, such as St. George’s assistance but also the dis‐
covery of relics like the Holy Lance and True Cross
(Riley‐Smith, 1987, p. 85). These relics were carried into
battle and served as powerful unifying and galvanizing
symbols. For example, while carrying the relic of the True
Cross the crusaders went undefeated 31 times until its
loss at the 1187 Battle of Hattin (Folda, 2008, p. 18;
Murray, 1998, pp. 232–238). By overcoming the odds
of a very arduous journey and a number of battles,
these relics, as well as the above‐mentioned cross of
St. George, processions, and other pious acts, became
symbols of God’s favor. Furthermore, they became the
rightful justification of their actions through the will
and favor of God, symbolizing within the ideology, the
“us vs. them” dichotomy where the Christian crusaders
were viewed as the legitimate heirs to the land, saving
it from an evil enemy. These concepts were described in,
for example, Bernard of Clairvaux’s (1090–1153) Liber ad
milites templi de laude novæ militiæ (ca. 1120–1136)
which demonstrates that the justification of violence
undergirded the crusades from the outset. This trea‐
tise adheres to arguments put forth by St. Augustine:
that although God’s commandment states “thou shall
not kill,” there are exceptions to this rule (Dods, 2014,
Book 1, Chapter 21). Bernard uses one of these excep‐
tions, that God commands the death because of injus‐
tice done to Him, in order to justify the crusades.
Figure 5. English Defence League Twitter
profile photo depicting the crusader cross
of St. George, April 11 2021. Source: EDL
Huddersfield (n.d.).
Figure 6. English Defence League Essex Division banner. Source: J. Busher
(personal communication).
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Furthermore, according to Bernard, God wills the war
because its enemy is evil incarnate, as is seen in his
comment that the crusader does not kill man, he kills
evil: “not homicide…but malicide” (Leclercq & Rochais,
1963, Chapter 4; see also Gazzoli, 2015). This distinction
of casting Muslims into the category of evil and distin‐
guishing between homicide and malicide justifies their
killing and sets up an “us vs. them” dichotomy. Rather
than advocate violence outright, the Identitarians and
Defence Leagues, through the adoption of ethnonational
symbols, draw on the crusades as both advocating the
use of violence and legitimizing its usage.
One common reference is that of the crusading
English King Richard the Lionheart who was one of the
crusader knights to place himself under the protection
of St. George. Richard I played a key role in the Siege
of Acre (August 1189–July 1191), which was described
as “the great set‐piece of the Third Crusade” (McGlynn,
2018). Acre was important strategically because it was a
port city. The siege went on for months and casualties
were severe for both sides (Lock, 2006, p. 151). Philip II
and Richard I offered their support in April and June 1191
and by July, Richard I accepted the city’s second proposal
of surrender which included money, ships, stores, a pris‐
oner exchange, and the return of the True Cross relic
(Lock, 2006, p. 154). Saladin failed to deliver some pris‐
oners of rank and Richard I retaliated by ordering the
massacre of approximately 3000Muslim hostages includ‐
ing wives and children (Lock, 2006, p. 77; Riley‐Smith,
1987, p. 116).
During the crusades, a number of military orders
were formed or expanded to ensure the safe passage of
pilgrims, like the Knights Templar, a group formed in 1119
by Hugh de Payens, Godfrey de Saint Omer, and other
knights. The templar knights, in their white mantles with
the symbol of St. George’s Cross on them, policed pil‐
grimage routes and managed robust economic infras‐
tructure throughout Christendom until Pope Clement V
disbanded the order in 1312.
Highly romanticized in literature, film, and television,
the Knights Templar feature prominently in reactionary
social movement imagery and narratives.With close con‐
nections to the English Defence League and Britain First,
Knights Templar International was founded in 2015 by
long‐time far‐right activist Jim Dowson (Figure 7; Cox
& Meisel, 2018). Aimed at allowing far‐right sympathiz‐
ers to support anti‐Islam, anti‐immigrant, and anti‐liberal
globalist efforts, it is believed to have thousands of pay‐
ing members globally (Cox & Meisel, 2018).
Images and historic narratives from the crusades
have been selectively employed by reactionary social
movements in Europe. Additionally, these movements
have drawn on prominent individuals as well as battles
against Muslim commanders from the Early and Late
medieval periods, where symbolic narratives are also
appropriated. Prominent references include the figure of
Charles Martel, who defeated Muslim Umayyad forces
led by Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi at the 732 Battle of
Tours and battles between European kingdoms and the
Ottoman Empire in the Late Middle Ages, such as the
1543 Siege of Nice (Braouezec, 2016; Richards, 2019;
Zúquete, 2018).
It is outside this inquiry’s scope to address the many
inaccuracies and simplifications by reactionary move‐
ments utilizing these ethnonational symbols, such as
the well‐documented esteem between Richard I and his
Muslim rival Saladin, or the fact that the Ottomans were
in alliance with France at the Siege of Nice. What is evi‐
dent by these selections is the preference for events
and narratives where Europeans, primarily Christians,
are in violent confrontationwith Eastern forceswhich are
predominately Muslim. The final section discusses why
these historic motifs and narratives are appropriated by
reactionary social movements as ethnonational symbols.
Figure 7. Jim Dowson has spoken in videos of an impending clash between Christians and Muslims, 1 May 2018. Source:
Cox and Meisel (2018).
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4. The Medieval Reimagined: The Utility of
Ethnonational Symbols for Reactionary Social
Movements
The Identitarians and Defence Leagues are reactionary
transnational social movements which have adopted
ethnonational symbols derived from radically nostalgic
interpretations of the medieval world, which encapsu‐
lates and simplifies strategic framing objectives: firstly,
through recalling a “golden age” of distinct, ethnona‐
tional European identities, which in their view has
now been lost; secondly, by identifying multiculturalism,
immigration, and the concomitant Islamization of Europe
as the explanation for the erosion of this ideal world;
thirdly, ethnonational symbols create amoral framework
arguing that the transnational battle against Islam in
the medieval period continues contemporaneously, but
is now ethnonational rather than religious; and finally,
that these forces should be expelled from Europe and
that violence is a justifiable response to achieve these
aims. The below considers each of these strategic frames
in turn.
Firstly, the use of ethnonational symbols derived
from the medieval period stems from a radically nostal‐
gic interpretation of the medieval period. Reactionary
social movements believe that distinct nations existed in
their purest formduring this period andmobilize to “rein‐
force” the ethnonational cultures specific to their terri‐
torialized nations. For instance, Génération Identitaire
draws on distinctly French associations, such as the late
medieval Military Commander Joan of Arc and the early
medieval King CharlesMartel (Elliott, 2017, p. 1; Simpson
& Druxes, 2015, p. 177). In parallel, the English Defence
League recalls the mythology of the crusades through
figures such as Richard I and the myths of St. George.
These ethnonational symbols nostalgically recall “golden
ages” for these particular national identifications and
are representative statements of belonging, as they con‐
struct national myths believed to uniquely define these
nations. They are also inherently exclusionary, ensuring
only those who claim derivation from these nations are
admitted to membership.
Secondly, ethnonational symbols apportion causal
blame to the sources of the perceived loss of this “golden
age” and the erosion of ethnonational attachments: mul‐
ticulturalism and the immigration of Muslims. The ideol‐
ogy of the Identitarians and Defence Leagues advances
that multiculturalism is leading to an erosion of eth‐
nonational cultures. For instance, rather than accept
the European Union’s construction of a continent‐wide
civic nationalism, reactionary transnational social move‐
ments are crafting a counter transnational identity based
on pre‐modern notions of distinct nations united by an
overarching Christian identity. For adherents, the cru‐
sades are a period which embodies this continent‐wide
identity and offers a compelling foil and alternativeworld
throughwhich to oppose civic nationalism. This ethnona‐
tional European civilization is exclusionary, such that
immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, are not able
to become members.
Furthermore, the Identitarians and Defence Leagues
adhere to a paranoid belief that an imperialistic Islam is
attempting to conquer Europe through immigration and
conversion. Despite the temporal and geographic varia‐
tion in the recollection of medieval myths by adherents,
one nearly universal narrative is evident, that of a pre‐
dominantly united Christian Europe in a violent, existen‐
tial battle against Islam. Key battles, discussed above, are
recalled to delineate the boundaries of this “us vs. them”
civilizational struggle. They are also employed to indi‐
cate intergenerational inheritance, whereby the mobi‐
lization of contemporary ethnonationalists view them‐
selves as inheritors of an ongoing battle against Islam
in Europe. Finally, references to these dramatic battles
framed as existential to European Christian civilization
also convey a sense of urgency, indicating that without
immediate violent resistance to defend Europe, both the
wider European civilization as well as distinct ethnona‐
tions will be destroyed.
Thirdly, the construction of ethnonational symbols
derived from radically nostalgic interpretations of the
medieval period moralizes the objectives of reactionary
social movements. The crusades were conceived as a
“moral” struggle, where distinct ethnic nations were
mobilized together as Christians in common cause
against a perceived threat from Islam. As noted above,
Christian symbols were employed by crusader leaders
to encapsulatemoral justification. Symbols were imbued
with intense religious meaning and as primary indica‐
tions of allegiance. Through the process of mediated
political medievalism, reactionary transnational move‐
ments have converted these religious symbols into
unifying ethnonational symbols. This moral framework
allows for their transnational, “European”movements to
retain nativist attachments, but which are nevertheless
united transnationally.
Finally, ethnonational symbols derived from the
medieval period prescribe and justify a violent approach
to returning to the idealized world envisioned by reac‐
tionary social movements. A hallmark of these move‐
ments is their effort to obfuscate their political ideol‐
ogy to render their movements and their views more
palatable to individuals outside extremism (Guenther
et al., 2020). Despite purporting to be non‐violent, the
Identitarians and Defence Leagues undertake military‐
style training and expect to engage in violent confronta‐
tion during demonstrations. Rather than call for violence
directly, they use ethnonational symbols from the cru‐
sades to legitimize violence.
5. Conclusion
Alongside the rise of reactionary political parties in
Europe in the first two decades of the 2000s, reactionary
transnational social movements have also emerged and
prominent amongst them are the Defence Leagues
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and the Identitarians. These movements emphasize
nativist, local attachments but have united transna‐
tionally around opposition to multiculturalism, immigra‐
tion, and Islam. Espousing ethnonational philosophies,
they have reimagined a radically nostalgic mythologized
“golden age” of distinct nations, they advocate an end
to immigration, and oppose the perceived Islamization
of Europe.
Medieval symbols drawn from the crusades refer‐
ence heroic figures such as St. George, Richard I, and
the Knights Templar, as well as key battles such as the
Siege of Antioch and the Siege of Acre. Once principally
Christian symbols imbued with religiosity, these themes
have been reconstructed through mediated political
medievalism and are now employed as ethnonational
symbols by the Identitarians and the Defence Leagues.
Ethnonational symbols encapsulate the philosophies and
political objectives of the Identitarians and the Defence
Leagues in a manner that obfuscates their xenophobic,
violent intentions.
The construction of ethnonational symbols derived
from the medieval period reimagines ideal worlds
through delineating an “us vs. them” boundary
between members of distinct “European” nations and
non‐members, recalls and simultaneously establishes
an intergenerational, transnational struggle against the
perceived incursion of Islam, and advances a solution
to the erosion of ethnonational identities by expelling,
including through violence, Muslims from Europe.
This article’s limitations have left open a number of
possible avenues for further research. Firstly, a more
thorough consideration of political economy factors
in driving mobilization is needed. As touched on by
Caiani (2019) and Muis and Immerzeel (2017), these
grievances have become more consequential since the
2009 economic crisis. Additional research emphasiz‐
ing economic grievances may better elucidate the anti‐
semitic nature of these movements in Europe, where
literature on the subject in the US is more advanced
(Blee & Creasap, 2010). Secondly, further theorizing is
required to explicate on the multi‐layered attachments
within far‐right reactionary movements, which variously
espouse forms of nativist attachments to the ethnona‐
tion, a transnational “European” nativism (including
beyond the European continent), and attachments to
specific localities. Finally, exploration of the other histor‐
ical contexts recalled by far‐right adherents is required,
including the use of ethnonational symbols derived from
the early and late medieval period emphasizing other
Christian‐Islamic encounters, such as battles between
the Ottoman Empire and European forces.
Acknowledgments
Wewould like to thank the editorial teamof this thematic
issue Tereza Capelos, Mikko Salmela, Stavroula Chrona,
and Cristiano Bee, as well as Dr. James Doherty and Iain
Dyson.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Bernsand, N. (2013). Friend or foe? Contemporary
debates on Islam and Muslim immigrants among
Swedish Identitarians. In T. Hoffmann & G. Larsson
(Eds.),Muslims and the new information and commu‐
nication technologies: Notes from an emerging and
infinite field (pp. 163–189). Springer.
Blee, K. M., & Creasap, K. A. (2010). Conservative and
right‐wing movements. Annual Review of Sociology,
36(1), 269–289.
Braouezec, K. (2016). Identifying commonpatterns of dis‐
course and strategy among the new extremist move‐
ments in Europe: The case of the English Defence
League and the Bloc Identitaire. Journal of Intercul‐
tural Studies, 37(6), 637–648.
Busher, J. (2016). The making of anti‐Muslim protest
(1st ed.). Routledge.
Caiani, M. (2018). Radical right cross‐national links and
international cooperation. In J. Rydgren (Ed.), The
Oxford handbook of the radical right (pp. 562–585).
Oxford University Press.
Caiani, M. (2019). The rise and endurance of radical right
movements. Current Sociology, 67, 1–18.
Caiani, M., & della Porta, D. (2018). The radical right
as social movement organizations. In J. Rydgren
(Ed.), The Oxford handbook of the radical right (pp.
327–347). Oxford University Press.
Caiani, M., & Weisskircher, M. (2019). How many
“Europes”? Left‐wing and right‐wing social move‐
ments and their visions of Europe. In C. Flesher Fom‐
inaya & R. A. Feenstra (Eds.), Routledge handbook of
contemporary European social movements: Protest
in turbulent times (pp. 30–45). Routledge.
Capelos, T., & Katsanidou, A. (2018). Reactionary politics:
Explaining the psychological roots of anti preferences
in European integration and immigration debates.
Political Psychology, 39(6), 1271–1288.
Castelli Gattinara, P., & Froio, C. (2014). Discourse and
practice of violence in the Italian extreme right:
Frames, symbols, and identity‐building in CasaPound
Italia. International Journal of Conflict and Violence,
8, 154–170.
Castelli Gattinara, P., & Pirro, A. L. P. (2019). The far
right as social movement. European Societies, 21(4),
447–462.
Conversi, D. (2009). Globalization and nationalism in
Europe: Demolishing walls and building boundaries.
In I. P. Karolewski & A. M. Suszycki (Eds.),Multiplicity
of nationalism in contemporary Europe (pp. 81–106).
Lexington Books.
Cox, A., & Meisel, S. (2018, May 1). Is this Britain’s most
influential far‐right activist? BBC. https://www.bbc.
com/news/uk‐43924702
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 215–226 224
Dods,M. (2014). Theworks of Aurelius Augustine, bishop
of Hippo (Vol. 1: The city of God). T&T Clark.
Durie, A. (2019, January 19). At the heart of hate:
Inside France’s Identitarian movement. Are We
Europe Magazine. https://magazine.areweeurope.
com/stories/uprooted/generation‐identitaire
Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (Eds.). (2010). The new
extremism in 21st century Britain. Routledge.




EDL Huddersfield. [@EDLHuddersfield]. (n.d.). Tweets
[Twitter profile]. https://twitter.com/edlhuddersfield
Elliott, A. B. R. (2017). Medievalism, politics and mass
media: Appropriating the Middle Ages in the twenty‐
first century. Boydell Press.
FOIA Research. (n.d.). Europa Jugend Reconquista White
Rex.jpg. https://www.foiaresearch.net/media/
image/europa‐jugend‐reconquista‐white‐rexjpg
Folda, J. (2008). Crusader art: The art of the crusaders in
the holy land: 1099–1291. Lund Humphries.
Ford, R. (2010). Who might vote for the BNP? Survey
evidence on the electoral potential of the extreme
right in Britain. In R. Eatwell &M.Goodwin (Eds.), The
new extremism in 21st century Britain (pp. 145–169).
Routledge.
Frankopan, P. (2016). The First Crusade: The call from the
east. Harvard University Press.
Gazzoli, M. J. (2015, March 17). St. Bernard and the
theology of crusade. The Josias. https://thejosias.
com/2015/03/17/st‐bernard‐and‐the‐theology‐of‐
crusade
Grindheim, J. E. (2019). Why right‐leaning populism has
grown in the most advanced liberal democracies of
Europe. The Political Quarterly, 90(4), 757–771.
Guenther, L., Ruhrmann, G., Bischoff, J., Penzel, T., &
Weber, A. (2020). Strategic framing and social media
engagement: Analyzing memes posted by the Ger‐
man Identitarian Movement on Facebook. Social
Media + Society, 6(1), 1–13.




Jackson, P., & Feldman, M. (2011). The EDL: Britain’s
“new far right” social movement. University of
Northampton. http://nectar.northampton.ac.uk/
6015
Karolewski, I. P. (2009). European nationalism and Euro‐
pean identity. In I. P. Karolewski & A. M. Suszycki
(Eds.), Multiplicity of nationalism in contemporary
Europe (pp. 59–80). Lexington Books.
Kassimeris, G., & Jackson, L. (2015). The ideology and dis‐
course of the EnglishDefence League: “Not racist, not
violent, just no longer silent.” The British Journal of
Politics & International Relations, 17(1), 171–188.
Kaufmann, E. (2019). Can narratives of white identity
reduce opposition to immigration and support for
hard Brexit? A survey experiment. Political Studies,
67(1), 31–46.
Kaya, A. (2021). Islamist and nativist reactionary radi‐
calization in Europe. Politics and Governance, 9(3),
204–214.
Kenny, M. (2017). Back to the populist future? Under‐
standing nostalgia in contemporary ideological
discourse. Journal of Political Ideologies, 22(3),
256–273.
Kiss, B. (2021). Double ressentiment. The political com‐
munication of Kulturkampf in Hungary. Politics and
Governance, 9(3), 227–236.
Klatch, R. E. (1988). Ofmeanings &masters: Political sym‐
bolism & symbolic action. Polity, 21(1), 137–154.
Koch, A. (2017). The new crusaders: Contemporary
extreme right symbolism and rhetoric. Perspectives
on Terrorism, 11(5), 13–24.
Kuzio, T. (2009). Civic nationalism and the nation‐state:
Towards a dynamic model of convergence. In I. P.
Karolewski & A. M. Suszycki (Eds.), Multiplicity of
nationalism in contemporary Europe (pp. 9–31). Lex‐
ington Books.
Leclercq, J., & Rochais, H. (Eds.). (1963). Sancti Bernardi
opera (Vol. 3: Tractatus et opuscula). Editiones
Cistercienses.
Livingstone, J. (2017, August 15). Racism, medievalism,




Lock, P. (2006). The Routledge companion to the cru‐
sades. Routledge.
Maly, I. (2018). The new right, global nationalistic
activism and the Flemish Identitarian movement




Mattheis, A., & Winter, C. (2019). The greatness of
her position: Comparing Identitarian and jihadi dis‐
courses on women. ICSR.
McGlynn, S. (2018, May 2018). The siege of Acre: A
monstrous blot on the Third Crusade. The Spectator.
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/05/the‐siege‐
of‐acre‐a‐monstrous‐blot‐on‐the‐third‐crusade
Meleagrou‐Hitchens, A., & Brun, H. (2013). A neo‐
nationalist network: The English Defence League and
Europe’s counter‐jihad movement. The International
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Polit‐
ical Violence. http://icsr.info/wp‐content/uploads/
2013/03/ICSR‐ECJM‐Report_Online.pdf
Morrow, E. A., & Meadowcroft, J. (2019). The rise and
fall of the English Defence League: Self‐governance,
marginal members and the far right. Political Studies,
67(3), 539–556.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe.
Cambridge University Press.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 215–226 225
Muis, J., & Immerzeel, T. (2017). Causes and conse‐
quences of the rise of populist radical right parties
and movements in Europe. Current Sociology, 65(6),
909–930.
Murray, A. V. (1998). Mighty against the enemies of
Christ: The relic of the true cross in the armies of
the kingdom of Jerusalem. In J. France & W. G. Zajac
(Eds.), The crusades and their sources: Essays pre‐
sented to Bernard Hamilton (pp. 217–238). Ashgate.
Nissen, A. (2020). The trans‐European mobilization of
“Generation Identity.” In O. C. Norocel, A. Hellström,
& M. B. Jørgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and hope: Inter‐
sections between politics of culture, welfare, and
migration in Europe (pp. 85–100). Springer.
Olsson, A.M. (2009). Theorizing regionalminority nation‐
alism. In I. P. Karolewski & A. M. Suszycki (Eds.),Mul‐
tiplicity of nationalism in contemporary Europe (pp.
107–132). Lexington Books.
Pilkington, H. (2016). Loud and proud: Passion and poli‐
tics in the English Defence League. Manchester Uni‐
versity Press.
Richards, I. (2019). A philosophical and historical analysis
of “Generation Identity”: Fascism, online media, and
the European new right. Terrorism and Political Vio‐
lence. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/
10.1080/09546553.2019.1662403
Riley‐Smith, J. (1987). The crusaders: A short history.
Athlone Press.
Rogers, C. J. (2010). The Oxford encyclopaedia of
medieval warfare and military technology. Oxford
University Press.
Rooduijn, M. (2015). The rise of the populist radical right
in Western Europe. European View, 14(1), 3–11.
Schlembach, R. (2011). The transnationality of European
nationalist movements. Revue Belge de Philologie et
d’Histoire, 89(3/4), 1331–1349.
Sharman, J., & Dearden, L. (2019, May 21). “Anti‐Islamic”
posters in Essex showing crusader chasing woman




Simpson, P. A., & Druxes, H. (2015). Digital media strate‐
gies of the far right in Europe and the United States.
Lexington Books.
Smith, A. D. (2009). Ethno‐symbolism and nationalism:
A cultural approach. Routledge.
The Spanish Defence League. (2015, May 10). Las cosas
claras como debe ser a nuestros enemigos terroristas
[Let us be perfectly clear so our enemies, who are




The US Holocaust Memorial Museum. (n.d.). Der
Bannerträger (The standard bearer), by Hubert
Lanzinger, circa 1935. https://www.ushmm.org/
propaganda/archive/painting‐the‐standard‐bearer
Tyerman, C. (1998). The invention of the crusades.
Macmillan Press.
Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear: What right‐wing
populist discourses mean. SAGE.
Zúquete, J. P. (2015). The new frontlines of right‐wing
nationalism. Journal of Political Ideologies, 20(1),
69–85.
Zúquete, J. P. (2018). The Identitarians: The movement
against globalism and Islam in Europe. University of
Notre Dame Press.
Zúquete, J. P. (2020, August 7). The European Alt‐Right’s




Matthew Godwin holds a PhD from University College London and has published articles in the
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Globalizations, and a
number of other publications. He is currently a program lead in the Extremism Policy Unit of the Tony
Blair Institute for Global Change.
Elisabeth Trischler is a PhD candidate in the Institute for Medieval Studies, exploring the intersection
of medieval art history and literature. Her current project analyzes how architecture and urban expan‐
sion in 13th‐ and 14th‐century Florence influenced the poetry of Dante Alighieri’s Commedia. She also
investigates how medieval culture has been reproduced and transmitted in contemporary culture.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 215–226 226
